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DUE CARE: STILL A LIMITATION ON 10b-5
RECOVERY?
From the time of its promulgation by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Rule 10b-51 has offered investors only
as much protection as the courts have considered necessary.
The scope of private actions for securities fraud has been con-
trolled in a number of ways. Because the civil remedy is a
creature of judicial implication' the courts have broad latitude
to infer elements and defenses.3 Additionally, the courts have
retained the discretion to determine liability on a case by case
basis,' since a flexible rule is necessary to accommodate a di-
verse investing public. 5 The due care limitation is one impor-
tant exercise of this discretionary power. Recognition of the due
care limitation on plaintiff's recovery has served to counter a
sudden increase in litigation under the Rule. Simply stated,
the due care limitation bars recovery where the plaintiff has
not acted reasonably to prevent the loss.
7
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977) provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
The Rule was promulgated in 1942 pursuant to the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
2. A private cause of action was first read into Rule 10b-5 in Kardon v. Nat'l
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The propriety of this practice was
upheld in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See Wheeler, Plaintiff's Duty of
Due Care Under Rule lob-5: An Implied Defense to an Implied Remedy, 70 Nw. U. L.
REv. 561 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Wheeler].
3. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1013 (5th Cir. 1977).
4. See, e.g., Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
[Tihe duty of reasonable diligence is an obligation imposed by law solely under
the peculiar circumstances of each case, including existence of a fiduciary rela-
tionship, concealment of the fraud, opportunity to detect it, position in the
industry, sophistication and expertise in the financial community, and knowl-
edge of related proceedings.
Id. at 103.
5. Id. at 103; Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963).
6. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1019 (5th Cir. 1977).
7. See Wheeler, supra note 2, at 568 and cases cited at 563 n.7.
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In addition to the due care requirement, the United States
Supreme Court recently imposed a second major limitation on
10b-5 recovery. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,8 the Court held
that allegations of negligent misrepresentation did not state a
cause of action for securities fraud under 10b-5. As a result,
there are now concurrent limitations on 10b-5 recovery: the
requirements of due care on the part of the plaintiff and wilful
conduct on the part of the defendant.
This article will consider the dual limitations of due care
and Ernst and examine whether both limitations should be
imposed on 10b-5 claims.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DUE CARE DEFENSE
Neither Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, nor
Rule 10b-5'explicitly provide for a private cause of action for
securities fraud.9 Instead, the courts have read the civil remedy
into the rule, acting on the premise that a private enforcement
mechanism is in tune with the purposes of the Securities Act.
Defrauded investors are considered to be more likely to proceed
on a civil basis than to pass their claims to the SEC for criminal
action.10
Initially, litigants in civil actions brought under Rule 10b-5
were handicapped by the lack of a clear statement of the ele-
ments needed to establish a cause of action. To fill this void,
the courts established a standard patterned after the common
law torts of misrepresentation and deceit." However, the cir-
cuits have not agreed on which of the elements of deceit are
necessary to state a 10b-5 claim.
For a time, the courts differed on the question of whether
the plaintiff was required to show scienter on the part of the
8. 425 U.S. 185, 197-99 (1976).
9. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975):
But as we have pointed out, we are not dealing here with any private right
created by the express language of § 10(b) or of Rule 10b-5. No language in either
of those provisions speaks at all to the contours of a private cause of action for
their violation. . . . We are dealing with a private cause of action which has
been judicially found to exist, and will have to be judicially delimited one way
or another unless and until Congress addresses the question.
10. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring).
11. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744 (1975);
Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 169 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 960 (1974); Wheeler, supra note 2, at 575 n.43. Essentially the rule is that
courts may draw analogies to tort concepts but are not to consider them controlling.
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defendant. At common law, plaintiffs were allowed to recover
only in cases where intentional or reckless misrepresentation or
omission was proved." However, once scienter was shown, the
plaintiff's fault in causing his loss became irrelevant. No duty
of due care was imposed on the claimant. 3 Instead, the plain-
tiff only had to prove that his reliance was justified 4 and that
the misrepresentations were not palpably false. 5 Recovery was
denied only where it was shown that, as a matter of law, the
plaintiffs reliance was so foolish that it caused the loss. 6 If a
plaintiff was denied recovery, it was because he could not prove
scienter, not because of any notion of contributory fault.
In comparison, some circuit courts of appeal did not require
a showing of scienter in order to recover under Rule 10b-5.
Since recovery was allowed in cases of negligent misconduct, 7
the scope of 10b-5 recovery was considerably broadened. To
restrict the scope of this liability, a number of courts denied
recovery where it was shown that the claimant failed to exercise
due care in the transaction. 8 The rationale behind the rule was
that a negligent plaintiff should not be allowed to recover from
a defendant whose liability was predicated solely on negli-
gence. 9
The due care limitation was later applied to plaintiffs whose
claims were based on intentional and reckless misrepresen-
tation.2 However, defendants who raised the issue in these
12. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 701 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER].
13. Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693-95 (10th Cir. 1976); PROSSER, supra
note 12, at 716.
14. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 717; 26 C.J.S. Fraud § 30 (1960).
15. See, e.g., Williams v. Rank & Son Buick, Inc., 44 Wis. 2d 239, 246, 170 N.W.2d
807, 810 (1969); PROSSER, supra note 12, at 717; 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 33 (1960).
16. Id.
17. See White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974); Myzel v. Fields, 386
F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Kohler v. Kohler
Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963); contra, Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1361-63
(10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228, 238-39 (2nd Cir. 1974); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d
1277, 1306 (2nd Cir. 1973).
18. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1019 (5th Cir. 1977); Note, The Due Diligence
Requirement for Plaintiffs Under Rule 10b-5, 1975 DUKE L.J. 753, 754.
19. 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW, § 8.4 (652), at 204.248 (1977).
20. Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 231 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970). Contra, Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d
353, 358 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970).
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cases were seldom successful.2 1 The courts which held due care
could be raised in the cases alleging intentional misconduct
barred plaintiff's recovery on policy grounds.22 This approach
afforded courts wide discretion2 to grant relief after consider-
ing all the equities of the parties. 24
I1. THE NATURE OF THE PLAINTFF's DUTY
The due care requirement mandates that an investor act
reasonably when he purchases or sells securities. The duty is
one of affirmative action to prevent the perpetration of a fraud-
ulent scheme." It might entail making inquiries or checking
records. Rather than being a uniform standard, like the duty
of reasonable care in negligence cases, the due care duty is
subjective .2 That is, the standard of care varies with each indi-
vidual investor under the circumstances.2 Personal character-
istics, as well as external factors, determine the level of care
demanded. A party's sophistication, business acumen, and the
situational context are all relevant.2 As a result, the level of
care required of plaintiffs has varied substantially. This discre-
tionary power to determine the duty of care required, coupled
with the freedom to define the elements of the 10b-5 claim, has
given the federal courts broad latitude to determine whether a
specific plaintiff should be allowed to recover.
The circuits have utilized at least three methods of raising
plaintiff's due care in the 10b-5 context. But these differing
procedural references have not varied the principle behind the
21. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1019; Wheeler, supra note 2, at 581.
22. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151-53 (1972); White v.
Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730-31 (9th Cir. 1974); Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine,
434 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); City Nat'l Bank v.
Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 231 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970).
23. See Wheeler, supra note 2, at 584.
24. See generally Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
25. See, e.g., Bird v. Ferry, 497 F.2d 112, 114 (5th Cir. 1974); Wheeler, supra note
2, cases cited at 563 n.7.
26. See, e.g., Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 102 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971). See generally Note, Reliance Under Rule 10b-
5: Is the "Reasonable Investor" Reasonable?, 72 COLuM. L. Rxv. 562, 565-66 (1972).
27. For example, a plaintiff's status as a corporate insider substantially raises the
level of which care must be exercised in the transaction. See, e.g., Holdsworth v.
Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 696-97 (10th Cir. 1976); Bird v. Ferry, 497 F.2d 112, 114 (5th Cir.
1974); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 736 (8th Cir. 1967).
28. Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
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due care requirement. An investor still has a duty to protect
himself from loss.
One procedure for raising the due care limitation is the
justifiable or reasonable reliance approach. 29 To recover for se-
curities fraud where this approach is followed, a plaintiff must
first prove that the purchase or sale was made because of the
misrepresentations." The plaintiff must also prove his reliance
was reasonable, given his access to sources of information, his
relationship to the other party, and other circumstances of the
case.3 ' This approach is a modification of the justifiable reli-
ance requirement of common law. Despite this procedural simi-
larity, the due care requirement is an active duty that did not
exist at common law.
A second procedure for raising the due care limitation is the
variable duty approach. 32 This standard imposes a duty on the
defendant to disclose only material facts.3 3 By implication, all
other facts must be discovered by the plaintiff, creating his
duty of care. Whether facts are considered material depends on
the plaintiff's sophistication, experience and access to informa-
tion.m It is a variable duty in that the duty to disclose varies
with the individual investor. The plaintiff must prove the ma-
teriality of the facts withheld.3 5
The last approach allows the defendant to raise the plain-
tiff's lack of care as an affirmative defense.36 The defendant has
the burden of proving that the investor, through the exercise
of reasonable diligence, should have ascertained the true facts.
29. Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607, 622-23 (5th Cir. 1974); White v. Abrams, 495
F.2d 724, 736 (9th Cir. 1974); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (3rd Cir.
1974); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 735-36 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 951 (1968); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963).
30. Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 695 (10th Cir. 1976).
31. See White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 736 (9th Cir. 1974); Myzel v. Fields, 386
F.2d 718, 736-37 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Kohler v. Kohler
Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963); Branham v. Material Systems Corp., 354 F.
Supp. 1048, 1056 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
32. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp.,
490 F.2d 414, 420 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974).
33. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 728 (9th Cir. 1974).
34. Id. at 735. See Wheeler, supra note 2, at 572-74.
35. Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 418 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
830 (1974).
36. Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 103 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
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As with the other approaches, the peculiar circumstances of the
investor dictate the standard of care that is required.37
Each of these procedures provides a bar to recovery in situa-
tions where a plaintiff contributes to his loss. Each was devel-
oped to restrict the virtually unlimited liability existing under
Rule 10b-5. However, these procedures have been criticized for
being inadequate to deal with the wide variety of fraud cases
that have arisen under the securities laws.
The reasonable reliance approach to due care has been criti-
cized because it cannot be utilized in cases of omission." In
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 39 the Supreme Court
ruled that proof of reliance was not necessary where a 10b-5
claim is based on omissions of fact. In such cases, proving
reliance is nearly impossible. Eliminating this requirement
removes the need to prove that the plaintiff's reliance was rea-
sonable. 0 Thus, in circuits which follow the reasonable reliance
standard, the issue of the plaintiff's lack of due care cannot be
raised. This creates an unfounded distinction between 10b-5
cases based upon misrepresentation and those based on omis-
sions. If the plaintiff is required to exercise due care, the duty
of investigation should not be limited solely to the facts repre-
sented.
Since the variable duty standard modifies the duty to dis-
close with each litigant, conduct which may violate 10b-5 in
one instance may not be actionable in another. However, 10b-
5 is a rule of prohibition and the question of whether it has been
violated should be determined with regard to the general pub-
lic, not the particular individual.4 2 Consequently, this ap-
proach undermines the regulatory effect of Rule 10b-5. There
is no precedent for comparing the fault of the parties to deter-
mine whether there has been a statutory violation.
The affirmative defense notion of due care escapes these
criticisms. Theoretically, the consideration of whether a defen-
dant has violated Rule 10b-5 is separate and distinct from the
37. Id.
38. See Wheeler, supra note 2, at 580-81; Note, The Due Diligence Requirement
for Plaintiffs Under Rule 10b-5, 1975 DUKE L.J. 753, 759.
39. 406 U.S. 128, 151-52 (1972).
40. McLean v. Alexander, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder], FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,725, at 90,548 (S.D. N.Y. 1976).
41. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 1974).
42. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1015 (5th Cir. 1977).
1977]
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consideration of whether the plaintiff has exercised due care.43
If the approach is to be criticized, it is because it was entirely
fashioned by judicial implication. The other approaches are
drawn from common law concepts, while the due care affirma-
tive defense is based solely on judicial interpretations of public
policy.,
Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine45 is the leading case
on the use of the due care affirmative defense. In McAlpine, a
brokerage firm sued another firm and an investor who had
collusively traded securities through the Evans Company. The
defendants were not the rightful owners of the securities
traded. When the scheme collapsed, the Evans Company pos-
sessed $300,000 in worthless checks. The Fifth Circuit Court
denied the plaintiff firm recovery, holding that the protections
of Rule 10b-5 extend only to "conscientious buyers and sellers
in good faith."4 Although it noted that other courts relied on
common law precedents to impose the duty of due care on
plaintiffs, the McAlpine court asserted that the limitation best
serves the purposes of the Securities Acts when raised as an
affirmative defense.4" The court also favored the approach be-
cause it affords the courts wide discretion in deciding 10b-5
cases.
The McAlpine court also ruled that the due care affirmative
defense may be raised by a defendant charged with intentional
misconduct. Thus, under this approach, recovery is dependent
upon a balancing of the equities by the trier of fact, regardless
of the character of the parties' conduct. McAlpine illustrates
the broad power of the federal courts to formulate standards for
10b-5 recovery and enforce the rule on a discretionary basis.
III. A NECESSARY ExcuRscus - Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder
Although Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder did not deal with the
plaintiffs duty of due care, the Court engaged in a broad dis-
43. See Note, The Due Diligence Requirement for Plaintiffs Under Rule 10b-5, 1975
DUKE L.J. 753, 758.
44. Most often courts state that the defense is necessary to encourage investor
caution. Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3rd Cir. 1976). For a further
discussion of policy, see note 86, infra.
45. 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
46. Id. at 104, quoting City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 105 (1970).
47. 434 F.2d at 104.
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cussion of the scope of recovery under Rule 10b-5." It is evident
that the Court's conception of Rule 10b-5 differs substantially
from that utilized by the circuits. It would appear that liberal
application of the due care standard, as in the McAlpine case,
will be severely restricted by the Ernst decision. In fact, the
decision may have sounded the death knell for the due care
defense.
If the reasoning behind the imposition of the scienter re-
quirement49 applies to defenses under Rule 10b-5, then plain-
tiffs will find it easier to recover once they have stated their
claim. The opinion stresses that courts should strictly adhere
to the language of Section 10b-5. 50 The Court reasoned that,
since the other sections of the Securities Act of 1934 are specific
in describing the circumstances to which they are to be ap-
plied, Section 10b is similarly limited by its language." As a
result, the privilege of "reading into" Section 10(b), and there-
fore, Rule 10b-5, has been curtailed. While the federal judiciary
should limit its interpretation to the language of the section,
some amount of interpretation must be allowed since the ele-
ments of a claim are not specified in either the section or the
Rule. Admittedly, this interpretation might recognize a duty of
due care. Nonetheless, on the basis of Ernst, it may be strongly
argued that the absence of language in the section and rule
supporting implication of a plaintiff's duty of care, precludes
a defendant from asserting that a plaintiff's conduct is rele-
vant.
Those who would eliminate the due care requirement can
find support for their position in the Court's discussion of
"knowing or intentional" misconduct. The Court held that the
congressional intent, manifest in the Act, was to prohibit cer-
tain illicit practices, 2 where the purchaser or seller has acted
48. By limiting 10b-5 recovery to circumstances where scienter is proved, the Court
eliminated a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation under the Rule.
49. 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
50. Id. at 201.
51. Id. at 200-03.
52. Id. at 199. There the Court discussed section 10(b):
The argument simply ignores the use of the words "manipulative," "device,"
and "contrivance" - terms that make unmistakable a congressional intent to
proscribe a type of conduct quite different from negligence. Use of the word
"manipulative" is especially significant. . . . It connotes intentional or willful
conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially
affecting the price of securities.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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knowingly and intentionally. It would appear to follow that
liability under 10b-5 should be determined solely on the basis
of the defendant's actions without regard to the conduct of the
other party to the transaction.
When a statute speaks so specifically in terms of manipula-
tion and deception, and of implementing devices and contriv-
ances - the commonly understood terminology of intentional
wrongdoing - and when its history reflects no more expan-
sive intent, we are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the
statute to negligent conduct.53
Thus, if one limits his analysis of 10b-5 as the Court did in
Ernst, it may be persuasively argued that any limitation on
10b-5 recovery is founded solely upon the defendant's conduct.
Ernst also reflects the Supreme Court's willingness to align
the 10b-5 remedy with the common law tort of deceit. 4 This is
apparent from the Court's use of common law principles to
define the scope of 10b-5 liability. The lower courts have also
looked to the common law to define the 10b-5 claim.55 The
circuit courts have adopted the common law definition of scien-
ter in actions brought under the securities laws.5 1
The Supreme Court in Ernst did not decide whether allega-
tions of reckless conduct are sufficient to state a 10b-5 claim.
Consequently, a strict reading of Ernst would limit 10b-5 to
situations of intentional misrepresentations. However, one
could argue that the Supreme Court could not have intended
to restrict scienter to something less than it was at common
53. Id. at 214.
54. Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693-94 (10th Cir. 1976).
55. Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 597 (3rd Cir. 1976); Beecher v. Able,
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,303, at 98,536 (S.D. N.Y.
1975). See Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule 10b-
5: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. Rav. 213 (1977).
56. McLean v. Alexander, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH)
95,725, at 90,550 (S.D. N.Y. 1976). At common law, scienter involves more than
intentional conduct alone, for it includes a state of mind evidencing a knowing of the
falsity or of the probability of falsity of one's representations and a desire to induce
the other to act on account of them. A knowing misrepresentation includes one made
with such a measure of assurance as to make another believe the actor knows the
representation is true when he does not actually know whether it is true or not. The
actor, in this circumstance, misrepresents what he does know. Similarly, scienter exists
if, from the circumstances, the actor must know he does not have sufficient information
to assert the fact as true. But if the actor believes the fact to be true, in all honesty
and good faith, then, he does not have the state of mind necessary to be held liable
for deceit. See generally PaossER, supra note 12, at § 107.
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law.-7 A narrow definition of scienter would result in deceit
being a broader remedy than 10b-5 and thus, frustrate the
explicit purpose of the Securities Acts of regulating illicit se-
curities transactions. If due care is recognized as a defense to
a 10b-5 action, this imposes a further limitation on recovery
which is not applicable to common law deceit.
IV. LmrriING DUE CARE
The various circuits that have discussed due care after
Ernst agree that the Supreme Court's decision calls for a recon-
sideration of the duty of due care. However, they disagree on
its place in the law of securities fraud. The question of whether
a due care limitation can concurrently exist with the scienter
limitation is partially answered by the court's approach to the
problem.
If a justifiable reliance approach is utilized a court is logi-
cally constrained to abrogate the requirement, 9 unless the rep-
resentations are palpably false. This was the result reached in
Holdsworth v. Strong."0 Strong, the manager and co-owner of
a close corporation, induced Holdsworth to sell his interests by
convincing him that his stock was practically worthless. When
57. The Ernst Court held that "knowing or intentional" misconduct is necessary
to state a 10b-5 claim. 425 U.S. at 199. Taken literally, this means that scienter is
limited to circumstances where the defendant is aware of the falsity of his representa-
tions, a result much more restrictive than at common law where scienter exists if
defendant has constructive knowledge of the falsity of his statements. See note 56,
supra. The varying definitions of scienter are well discussed in White v. Abrams, 495
F.2d 724, 728 n.3 (9th Cir. 1974).
58. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1017 (5th Cir. 1977); Holdsworth v. Strong,
545 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir. 1976); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 597 (3rd
Cir. 1976); McLean v. Alexander, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,725, at 90,548 (S.D. N.Y. 1976).
59. See Wheeler, supra note 2, at 583.
60. 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976). The case was heard en banc after a petition for
rehearing from the decision of a three judge panel, pursuant to FED. R. APP. P. 35, and
28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970). The panel had held that Holdsworth's failure to diligently
examine the corporate records "does not approach the due diligence requirement con-
sistently articulated by this Court." [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,465, at 99,363 (10th Cir. 1976). Using a subjective standard, the panel
concluded the defense was nonetheless properly invoked in the face of intentional
misrepresentations. Id. at 99,361-63. Judge Doyle argued in his dissent that "no legal
relationship exists between intentional harm and contributory negligence" and, on the
facts, "the close relationship of trust and confidence" made the plaintiffs conduct
"irrelevant." Id. at 99,365.
Judge Doyle, writing for the court, rejected the subjective approach. 545 F.2d at
695.
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Holdsworth learned that the company was making record prof-
its, he sued for rescission and damages. Strong raised the ques-
tion of the plaintiffs lack of care, relying on Holdsworth's busi-
ness experience, legal and business education, and access to
corporate records. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the due care limitation is "irrational and unrelated" to the
action where a defendant has acted with scienter The court
adhered to the scienter limitation on 10b-5 recovery,6" and due
care was discussed in terms of justifiable reliance.63 This result
is in accord with the strict construction approach of Ernst and
common law precedents.
The court went on to consider whether reliance was shown
and, if so, whether such reliance was justifiable. It responded
to the reliance problem which frequently arises in omissions
cases by interpreting Affiliated Ute to restrict the reliance re-
quirement to misrepresentation cases, and not to eliminate it
altogether. 4 The court held that the materiality of the omitted
facts must still be shown, in effect, requiring the plaintiff to
prove reliance. Since the court's holding merely imposed the
materiality requirement, the court indulged in a measure of
judicial circumlocution. The materiality approach to due care
cannot validate the justifiable reliance approach to the limita-
tion.
In order to discern whether the plaintiff's reliance was justi-
fiable, the Holdsworth court looked to the usual factors consid-
ered in discussions of due care.65 It held that the plaintiff's
reliance was justifiable in light of the trusting relationship be-
tween the parties and the absence of pertinent information in
the corporate records. Despite the court's specific language
abolishing the due care limitation, it may be possible to formu-
late circumstances where due care would still be a bar to recov-
ery due to the absence of factors making reliance justifiable.
Consequently, the Tenth Circuit might find that a sophisti-
61. Id. at 692.
62. Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1361-63 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1007 (1975).
63. See Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 517
(10th Cir. 1973); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 103 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
64. 545 F.2d at 695.
65. The court considered the plaintiff's sophistication, his access to information,
and the fiduciary relationship between the parties. Id. at 696-97.
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cated investor's purchase of close corporation stock without
investigation is unreasonable. The court's statement that
"[i]f contributory fault of plaintiff is to cancel out wanton or
intentional fraud, it ought to be gross conduct somewhat com-
parable to that of defendant,""6 has been interpreted to mean
that the due care limitation is available in such circumstan-
ces. 7 It should be noted, however, that the common law test
was whether the representation was palpably false, not whether
the circumstances revealed justification for the reliance.
The effect of the Ernst case on the due care limitation was
also discussed in McLean v. Alexander.8 There, the District
Court for the Southern District of New York considered
whether reasonable reliance could be raised when a defendant
is accused of reckless misconduct. McLean's claim was based
on an allegedly reckless misrepresentation that appeared in a
bond solicitation. What was represented to be the accounts
receivable figure was actually the consignments listing. Claim-
ing he had relied on the corporation's apparent financial stabil-
ity, as represented in the solicitation, McLean sued the accoun-
tants responsible for its preparation. At the time, his $1.7 mil-
lion investment in the technological products concern had a
negative net worth of $66,000.
The court considered the plaintiff's duty of care as a duty
of reasonable reliance.69 Because of the logical contraints the
common law imposes upon this approach, the court did not
fully address the issue of whether the plaintiff's lack of due care
is a defense to a lefendant's allegedly intentional misconduct.
Instead, the court noted the need for reevaluation of the limita-
tion in light of Ernst, and only discussed the propriety of due
care in situations of reckless misconduct The court concluded
that the due care duty exists in such circumstances: "There is,
however, a wide spectrum of prohibited behavior between neg-
ligence and specific intent to defraud. In that uncharted land
of knowing and reckless misconduct, defendant should be enti-
tled to contest liability by asserting a due diligence defense.""0
66. Id. at 693.
67. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1017 (5th Cir. 1977).
68. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,725 (S.D. N.Y.
1976).
69. Id. at 90,549.
70. Id. at 90,548.
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This implies that a plaintiff need not exercise due care if the
defendant's fraud was intentional.
The McLean case represents a marked departure from com-
mon law precedents. 7' A plaintiff who was damaged by a defen-
dant's reckless or intentional misrepresentation was barred
from recovering only where the representations were palpably
false 2 or the plaintiff's conduct was comparable to that of the
defendant. However, under McLean, a plaintiff's negligence
precludes recovery if there is reckless misconduct. In effect,
this imposes a higher standard of care on plaintiff than on
defendant. The common law approach was that, regardless of
whether the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, the
standard of palpable falsity was applied. Furthermore,
McLean produces the anomalous result that an investor's neg-
ligent failure to investigate a representation is more reprehensi-
ble when the perpetrator of the fraud has acted recklessly than
when the misconduct is intentional. Such an approach leaves
much to be desired.
The use of the affirmative defense approach to due care is
not constrained by common law concepts, as it is purely a
product of judicial implication.7 3 As a result, the common law
notion that the plaintiff's negligent conduct is not a defense to
intentional misrepresentation need not be considered control-
ling. Courts that utilize the affirmative defense approach are
71. See PROSSER, supra note 12, at 426.
72. Id. To say that a single standard of care is required of a plaintiff whether the
defendant acts intentionally or recklessly is not the same as saying there is a single
standard of care for all plaintiffs. Even at common law what was considered patently
false varied with the individual plaintiff. RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS § 541, Com-
ment a (1977) - Representation Known to Be or Obviously False, states:
a. Although the recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is not barred
from recovery because he could have discovered its falsity if he had shown his
distrust of the maker's honesty by investigating its truth, he is nonetheless
required to use his senses, and cannot recover if he blindly relies upon a misre-
presentation the falsity of which would be patent to him if he had utilized his
opportunity to make a cursory examination or investigation. Thus, if one in-
duces another to buy a horse by representing it to be sound, the purchaser
cannot recover even though the horse has but one eye, if the horse is shown to
the purchaser before he buys it and the slightest inspection would have disclosed
the defect. On the other hand, the rule stated in this Section applies only when
the recipient of the misrepresentation is capable of appreciating its falsity at the
time by the use of his senses. Thus a defect that any experienced horseman
would at once recognize at first glance may not be patent to a person who has
had no experience with horses.
73. See, e.g., Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
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better suited to consider whether scienter and due diligence
should be concurrent limitations on 10b-5 recovery.
At first glance, the Ernst decision would appear to elimi-
nate the affirmative defense approach to due care. The Court's
strict construction of section 10(b) and close adherence to com-
mon law concepts leaves little room for judicial implication of
defenses. Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
cently discussed the use of due care as an affirmative defense.
In Dupuy v. Dupuy,74 as in McAlpine, the court relied upon
policy considerations:
First, general principles of equity suggest that only those who
have pursued their own interests with care and good faith
should qualify for the judicially created private 10b-5 reme-
dies. . . . Second, by requiring plaintiffs to invest carefully,
the Court promotes the anti-fraud policies of the Acts and
engenders stability in the markets.75
These policy considerations are, of themselves, unconvincing,
since countervailing policy arguments are easily suggested."
However, the Dupuy court went on to point out the problems
inherent in the justifiable reliance and variable duty ap-
proaches. If due care is to remain a viable concept, it should
be used as an affirmative defense, in view of the limited effec-
tiveness of the other approaches.
Although the Dupuy court held that the plaintiff's lack of
care is an affirmative defense, it did not state that it was avail-
74. 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1977).
75. Id. at 1014.
76. The list of contrary policy considerations includes the following: By enacting
securities legislation Congress sought to substitute policy of full disclosure for that of
caveat emptor. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972).
Actual knowledge of a fact cannot be equated with the opportunity to ascertain that
fact. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975). The civil action for
securities fraud complements the SEC's criminal enforcement provisions and results
in more effective securities control. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
Rule 10b-5 is a catch-all provision meant to encompass the imaginative scheme and
artifice. Wheeler, supra note 2, at 565 n.13.
The purposes of the Securities Act of 1934 are set out in Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,
479 F.2d 1277, 1290 n.34 (2nd Cir. 1973):
This report lists six purposes of the proposed legislation: (1) control of credits;
(2) control of manipulative stock market practices (e. g., wash sales, matched
orders, stock market pools); (3) the provision of adequate and honest reports to
security holders by registered corporations; (4) control of unfair practices by
corporate insiders; (5) control of exchanges and over-the-counter markets; and
(6) administrative reform.
Citing H. R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-16 (1934).
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able as a defense in cases of intentional misconduct. The extent
of the duty of investigation when a defendant has acted inten-
tionally is entirely a separate question, a question which the
court discussed at some length.
Milton Dupuy, the plaintiff, sold his interests in a hotel
development corporation to defendant Clarence Dupuy, his
brother. Milton sold the stock believing that plans for building
a hotel on the corporation's only asset, a valuable lot, had
fallen through. Shortly after the sale, Clarence concluded nego-
tiations for a highly profitable corporate partnership for such
a hotel. Relying on Milton's position as a corporate insider and
the estranged relationship he had with Clarence at the time of
the sale, the district court dismissed Milton's 10b-5 claim be-
cause of his failure to exercise due care. The court of appeals
reversed, holding that negligence is not a defense to intentional
fraud.
The court offered four reasons for restricting the due care
defense in light of the scienter requirement for defendants.
First, since contributory fault is not a defense to deceit, it
should not be a defense to 10b-5 violations." Tort concepts
should be given particular weight because "the policy of deter-
ring intentional misconduct outweighs that of deterring negli-
gent behavior,"" and losses should be borne by the person more
at fault of two culpable actors. 9 Secondly, the tort concepts
produce a result in accord with the policies of the securities
acts." The court stated that a strict reading of Rule 10b-5
revealed a greater concern with deterring intentional miscon-
duct than with deterring negligent behavior by investors. For
a third reason, the court noted that Ernst diminished the need
77. 551 F.2d at 1018, citing PRossEa, supra note 12, at 716. Prosser wrote: "where
there is an intent to mislead [barring recovery] is clearly inconsistent with the general
rule that mere negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense to an intentional tort. The
better reasoned cases have rejected contributory negligence as a defense applicable to
intentional deceit."
78. 551 F.2d at 1018.
79. Id., citing PROSSER, supra note 12, at 426. Again the author's language is mean-
ingful: "[Intentional] conduct differs from negligence not only in degree but in kind,
and in the social condemnation attached to it. . . .It is in reality a rule of comparative
fault which is being applied, and the court is refusing to set up the lesser fault against
the greater."
80. 551 F.2d at 1019. The court considered the policy of prevention of manipulative
and deceptive practices controlling. Id. Compare this to the McAlpine view, supra note
44 and accompanying text.
81. 551 F.2d at 1019.
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for limitations on 10b-5 recovery. Scienter adequately serves to
limit the scope of liability under the rule. Any further restric-
tions would excessively limit the situations in which a plaintiff
could recover under 10b-5.12 Lastly, the court stated that its
holding was consistent with prior case law. Early due care cases
were said to allow the defense only where the conduct of the
parties was of a similar character. For example, a negligent
breach of the due care duty was a defense to negligent misre-
presentations. In such cases, the courts imposed "on the plain-
tiff only a standard of care not exceeding that imposed on the
defendant.''84 Since Clarence Dupuy intentionally misrepre-
sented the corporation's financial situation, Milton could only
be barred from recovering his loss if he "intentionally refused
to investigate 'in disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious
that he must be taken to have been aware of it, and so great
as to make it highly probable that harm would follow'. 8 5 Al-
though Milton's interests in the corporation placed him in a
position to discover the negotiations, the court ruled that a jury
could conclude that his sale was reasonable. Since the informa-
tion concerned matters outside the corporate records, Milton
might not be expected to discover the fraud from those avail-
able to him. If Milton acted reasonably, he acted without the
recklessness required to bar recovery in the face of intentional
misconduct.
The Dupuy decision is a clear departure from the early
interpretations of due care in two respects. First, the standard
of care imposed on the plaintiff varies with the type of miscon-
duct allegedly perpetrated by the defendant. When the defen-
dant acts intentionally, the common law standard of palpable
falsity is applied. However, the plaintiff's standard of care may
be higher if his claim alleges reckless misconduct. Thus, an-
other duty, framed in terms of recklessness, may have been
created by the Fifth Circuit.
Second, the court's holding marks a clear retreat from the
broad powers of implication and judicial discretion recognized
in McAlpine. Under Dupuy, courts are constrained to limit
their investigation of the plaintiff's conduct according to the
82. Id., citing Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir. 1976).
83. 551 F.2d at 1019. See Wheeler, supra note 2, at 582-83.
84. 551 F.2d at 1020.
85. Id.
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character of misconduct proved for the defendant.
A contrary result was reached by the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals in Straub v. Vaisman and Co.,86 where the court
held that a plaintiff must show reasonable action. The case
arose when the plaintiff, a manager of a european portfolio
management firm, purchased stock in Loren Industries. The
purchase was made at the recommendation of the Vaisman
Investment Corporation. The Vaisman Corporation, by coinci-
dence, was solely owned by the majority shareholder of Loren
Industries who knew of Loren's imminent bankruptcy.
In deciding the due care issue, the court considered several
arguments for circumscribing the due care defense. It balanced
the policy of promoting diligence against the equity of the com-
mon law approach and concluded that considerations in favor
of the former predominated. 7 Nonetheless, since the defendant
intentionally timed the transaction to occur when the true facts
would be unknown, the court found the plaintiff had exercised
due care.
The Straub opinion is important because, despite Ernst,
the court concluded the due care limitation on 10b-5 recovery
remains viable. Its rationale is surprisingly simple. Although
Ernst requires a narrow construction of section 10(b), promot-
ing investor caution is more important. The due care require-
ment is a means by which this policy can be achieved. How-
ever, the court's approach is oversimplified. It does not address
the equities of 10b-5 recovery, which are a focal point of discus-
sion in decisions of other circuits. The justification for the
Third Circuit's approach is merely an assertion of policy that
is essentially unsupportable. Countervailing policies are
equally convincing, 88 particularly the consideration that inten-
tional misconduct has historically been considered more repre-
hensible than mere negligence. Because of the court's failure to
discuss pertinent issues in depth, the Straub holding is of ques-
tionable precedential value. 89
86. 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3rd Cir. 1976).
87. Id. at 597-98.
88. See discussion at note 76, supra.
89. Another post-Ernst court has held that due care is a defense to a 10b-5 action.
In Hirsch v. duPont, [current binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,011 (2nd Cir. 1977)
the court stated:
The securities laws were not enacted to protect sophisticated businessmen from
their own errors of judgment. Such investors must, if they wish to recover under
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V. CONCLUSION
As the Holdsworth and Dupuy cases reveal, due care has
lost much of its effectiveness as a limitation on 10b-5 recovery.
The elimination of negligence as a basis for liability under the
rule limits recovery to cases where the element of scienter is
shown. In actions founded on intentional misconduct, the
courts have looked to the common law equities and the lan-
guage of the Rule and concluded that the plaintiffs failure to
exercise due care does not preclude recovery except in unusual
circumstances. The common law concept of palpable falsity is
equivalent to a "gross" or "intentional" disregard of fact. In
short, the Fifth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeal have fully
addressed the question and accepted the wisdom of the com-
mon law answers.
Left unanswered is the question of what measure of care is
required of a plaintiff when the defendant's acts are reckless.
The answer will depend in part on the court's definition of
scienter. If scienter is defined as broadly for 10b-5 purposes as
it was at common law, then the Holdsworth and Dupuy cases
offer possible answers.
A strict adherence to common law principles would require
the application of the palpably false standard of care for plain-
tiffs in actions grounded on scienter. Such an approach would
effectively eliminate the due care limitation.
In those courts where due care is an affirmative defense, the
opportunity remains to determine a particular standard of care
demanded of plaintiffs when the defendant acts recklessly.
Dupuy laid the foundation for setting due care standards by
holding that the level of care demanded of a plaintiff cannot
exceed that demanded of a defendant. Due care should only be
a defense to comparable conduct. This approach is consistent
with both 10b-5 policy and principles of equity.
Recent case developments have severely restricted judicial
innovation in actions brought under Rule 10b-5. The status of
the due care requirement reflects this development. Courts
have lost the freedom to allow recovery on the basis of their own
perception of each case.
GEORGE S. BARANKO
federal law, investigate the information available to them with the care and
prudence expected from people blessed with full access to information. We
believe that the diligence of the appellants in this case fell far short of the mark.
Id. at 91,547.
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